

Kommentierte Literaturhinweise

■ I – Hauptlektüre

Brown, J. & Gerken, M. (2012). Introduction: Knowledge Ascriptions - their semantics, cognitive bases and social functions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken, *Knowledge Ascriptions*. OUP, 1–30. [Gute Einführung in die Thematik]

DeRose, K. (1999). Contextualism: An explanation and defense. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa, *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*. Wiley-Blackwell, 187–205. [Zum Kontextualismus]

Nagel, J. (2010). Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error. *Philosophical Quarterly* **60**:286–306. [Zum Nagelschen Ansatz]

Nagel, J.; San Juan, V. & Mar, R. A. (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. *Cognition* **129**:652–661. [Empirische Studie über Wissenszuschreibungen]

■ II – Weiterführende Lektüre

Alexander, J.; Gonnerman, C. & Waterman, J. (2014). Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study. In James R. Beebe, *Advances in Experimental Epistemology*. Bloomsbury, 97–117. [Empirische Studie, die für den Nagelschen Ansatz spricht]

Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2003). Context Shifting Arguments. *Philosophical Perspectives*, **17**:25–50. [Über Tests für Kontextabhängigkeit]

Dimmock, Paul (2019). Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias. *Synthese* **196**:3409–3432. [Kritik am Nagelschen Ansatz]

Lewis, David (1996). Elusive knowledge. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **74**:549–567. [Verteidigung des Kontextualismus]

Williamson, Timothy (2005). Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge. *Philosophical Quarterly* **55**:213–235. [Kritik am Kontextualismus; Williamsons Ansicht wird in Nagel 2010 (oben) kritisch diskutiert]